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ABSTRACT
In this short paper, we consider how the hierarchical structure in transportation, in
which goods are transported from demand points to nearby terminal stations in the first
level of hierarchy and from station to station in the second, emerges in competition between
transportation companies having economies of scale in volume and distance. We conmpare
the competitive and planning locations of terminal stations of the hierarchical system using
a Hotelling-style spatial competition model (1929). We find that a competitive location can
be generated in an area where the planning location can never be generated. We also find no
difference between the two when point-to-point transportation is replaced by transportation
in bulk.
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1 Introduction
One possible mode of transporting goods is a point-to-point transportation system, which
transports goods directly from their origin to the final destination without any transship-
ments. Another mode is a hierarchical transportation system, in which goods are once
collected in a nearby terminal station and each terminal station directly transports goods in
bulk from station to station and delivers goods transported from other stations to their final
destination points. The hierarchical transportation system faces two types of transportation
costs: first from the origin/destination to its nearby station and the second from station to
station. In the presense of economy of scale of volume in transportation, collecting many
goods in a terminal station can result in high transport density and reduce the average costs
of station-to-station transportation. Consequently, the hierarchical transportation system
can outweigh point-to-point transportation in total transportation cost although even its
path takes a detour in moving distance. Many researchers have tackled the problem of the
emergence of hierarchical structure in transportation in relation to point-to-point transporta-
tion.
Suzuki and Kawaguchi (1998) supposed that a company plans to locate multiple trans-
shipment stations in a linear city and numerically studied their optimal location in the
presence of economy of scale in volume to be transported. In their model, customers are
uniformly distributed in the linear city and each customer has a constant unit of demand
to be transported to the final destination point fixed in the city center, experiencing one
transshipment at the station in their nearest neighbor. The company chooses the location
of multiple stations to minimize the total transportation cost, consisting of one from each
customer to the nearby station (point-to-point) and one from the station to the final des-
tination (station-to-station). Matching the optimal location with the city center indicates
diseconomy in transshipment is diseconomy. In an optimal location, the stations tend to
concentrate in the city center if the economy of scale and the demand for transportation are
small.
Watanabe and Suzuki (2000) and Suzuki and Watanabe (2009) studied the nature of
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hierarchical transportation systems using the total number of transshipments. In other
words, levels of the hierarchical transportation system, in which a trip goes from its origin
to final destination and the number of stations in a level, both of which are optimized to
minimize total transportation cost. They assume that the transportation cost is subject
to economy of scale for not only to volume but also traveling distance. The essence of
their studies is that the logarithm of the optimal number of stations in a level is written
by the first-order decreasing function with respect to the number of relevant levels from
the lowest, with the intercept term being the logarithm of total transportation demand. In
Beckmann(1958), we can observe similarity of rank size rule in city sizes, the relationship
between the number of cities in a level and the number of the level from the highest level of
hierarchy of cities.
We observe economy of scale play an important role in determining the structure of a
hierarchical transportation system. However, we realize that strategic behaviors between
competitive transportation companies matter as well as economies of scale in determining
the system. In this study, we employ spatially competitive location model in Hotelling (1929)
and analyze the emergence of a hierarchical transportation system under competition in the
presence of economies of scale.
2 Model
We consider a Hotelling style linear city expressed by a line segment [0, L]. In the city, cus-
tomers are uniformly distributed and each customer has a constant demand for transporting
goods of 1/L in volume from their locational point t ∈ [0, L] to the final destination point
fixed at tD = L/2. Transportation companies denoted as i, i = 1, 2, ...n, are planning to en-
ter the city, which can choose their location of single terminal station denoted as xi ∈ [0, L],
and all of them are obliged to transport the goods they collect at their terminal station to
the market center tD = L/2. If xi = tD = L/2, transshipment does not happen in company
i’s system. Each customer utilizes the terminal station at their nearest neighbor. Figure 1
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illustrates the assumption of the model.
Point-to-station transportation
xD=L/2
Final Destination
Terminal Station i Terminal Station j
Station-to-station transportation
x jx i (x i+x j)/2
Transportation Cost
Figure 1: Assumption of our model.
All the companies face a common transportation cost function, which is an increasing
function with respect to traveling distance d and volume to be transported v written as
ci(v, t) = Const.× vαdβ, 0 < α, 0 < β. (1)
If 0 < α < 1 (0 < β < 1), economy of scale with respect to volue (distance) exists.
Competitive location of terminal stations
Suppose that there are two transporting companies i and j in the city whose terminal
station locations are xi < xj without loss of generality. Then, the companies i and j face
the following transportation cost functions
Ci(xi, xj) =
∫ xi+xj
2
0
ñ
1
L
ôα
|t− xi|β dt+
∫ xi+xj2
0
1
L
dt
α ∣∣∣∣∣L2 − xi
∣∣∣∣∣
β
, (2)
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and
Cj(xi, xj) =
∫ L
xi+xj
2
ñ
1
L
ôα
|t− xj|β dt+
ñ∫ L
xi+xj
2
1
L
dt
ôα ∣∣∣∣∣xj − L2 ∣∣∣∣∣β , (3)
respectively. The first terms in (2) and (3) represent the sum of transportation cost from
each customer to its nearby station and the second terms represent the sum of transportation
costs from the station to the final destination in bulk transportation. Each company tries to
minimize average cost defined by ACi(xi, xj) = Ci(xi, xj)/Vi(xi, xj), where Vi(xi, xj) =
xi+yj
2
and Vj(xi, xj) = L − xi+yj2 . Then, companies choose their locations to satisfy the Nash
equilibrium ACi(x
∗
i , x
∗
j) ≤ ACi(xi, x∗j) and ACi(x∗i , x∗j) ≤ ACi(x∗i , xj), where x∗i and x∗j are
equilibrium locations of terminal stations for i and j, respectively.
Planning location of terminal stations
For comparative reasons, we consider the optimal location of terminal stations xi and xj.
The planner chooses the set of locations xi and xj to minimize the average transportation
cost function,
min
xi,xj
ñ
Ci(xi, xj) + Cj(xi, xj)
L
ô
. (4)
3 Numerical Study
We conducted numerical calculations with respect to parameters α, β, and L because it is
impossible to derive the solutions analytically in (2), (3), and (4). In Figure 2, we present
the plots of the equilibrium and the planning locations with respect to α, β, and L in typical
cases. We observe the following features in the results.
1. When L = 1, β = 1.0, and α ≥ 1.5 in the upper left panel of Figure 2, no equilibrium
locations exist.
2. In the absence of economy of scale in distance, which is illustrated in the upper three
panels, we observe the dispersed locations emerge in both the compatitive and plan-
ning situations, as the demand for transportation becomes larger (L gets larger) and
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Figure 2: Blue solid lines: Competitive locations. Red dashed line: Planning locations.
Black dotted lines: The first and the third quartile locational points.
economy of scale in volume becomes prominent (α gets smaller). This is because
station-to-station transportation can save more total cost than point-to-point trans-
portation when demand is large and economy of scale in volume works.
3. In the absence of economy of scale in volume, which is illustrated in the lower three
panels, we observe the dispersed locations emerge in both compatitive and planning
situations, as economy of scale in distance declines (β becomes larger). This is because
companies have the incentive to reduce transportation cost from the demand points to
the nearby terminal station, when economies of scale in distance and volume do not
work.
4. When economy of scale in volume is prominent and the demand for transportation is
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large, in the cases in the upper three panels of Figure 2, we observe the competitive
locations in the area x ≤ L/4, 3L/4 ≤ x∗, whereas we do not observe the planning
locations in the area. This is proved because the first derivative of the total cost
function (4) with respect to xi under symmetry of the model xj = L−xi, is written as
d
dxi
ñ
Ci(xi, L− xi) + Cj(xi, L− xi)
L
ô
=
2
Lα+1
[
xβi −
Ç
L
2
− xi
åβ]
− 2
1−αβ
L
Ç
L
2
− xi
åβ−1
< 0 (5)
in the area 0 ≤ xi ≤ L4 .
5. Point-to-point transportation is replaced by transportation in bulk at α = 1 or β = 1
both in planning and competition.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
In this short paper, we consider the problem of how hierarchical structure in transportation
emerges in competition between companies having scale of economies in volume and distance
in transportation. We consider the differences between the competitive and planning loca-
tions of the terminal stations of a two-level hierarchical transportation system. The major
difference between the two is that the competitive location can be generated in an area where
the planning location can never be generated. This difference in location is caused by the
strategic behavior of companies. We also find no difference between the two in the values of
α or β at which the point-to-point transportation is replaced by transportation in bulk.
For further study, we consider the competition between multiple transportation com-
panies and the competition in two-dimensional space. We would also like to consider how
the number of terminal stations in a level and the total number of levels in a hierarchy are
competitively determined.
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